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Abstract: This paper examines the differences between moralist, realist, and 
pragmatist approaches to political legitimacy by articulating their largely implicit 
views of judgment. Three claims are advanced. First, the salient opposition among 
approaches to legitimacy is not between “moralism” and “realism.” Recent realist 
proposals for rethinking legitimacy share with moralist views a distinctive form, 
called “normativism”: a quest for knowledge of principles that solve the question of 
legitimacy. This assumes that judging legitimacy is a matter of applying such 
principles to a case at hand. Second, neither Rawls nor Habermas is a normativist 
about political legitimacy. The principles of legitimacy they proffer claim to express 
rather than adjudicate the legitimacy of a liberal-democratic regime, and thus cannot 
solve the question of legitimacy at a fundamental level. But perhaps we should 
question the normativist aspiration to theoretically resolving the problem to begin 
with. My third claim is that a “pragmatist” approach enables us to rethink political 
legitimacy more deeply by shifting focus from the articulation of principles to the 
activity of judging. Implicit in Rawls and Habermas’s theories I then find clues 
towards an alternative account of judgment, in which the question of legitimacy calls 
not for theoretical resolution but for ongoing practical engagement.  
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Introduction 
This paper aims to illuminate what distinguishes the most important approaches to 
political legitimacy currently on offer in political theory. It does so by articulating the 
largely implicit views of judging legitimacy that various theories presuppose, setting 
aside the specific conceptions of legitimacy they defend. By ‘political’ legitimacy I 
mean the normative entitlement (or ‘right to rule’) of the regime or the political order 
as such, not so much a particular leader, policy, law, or institution. As I interpret the 
question of legitimacy, this is a question of how to relate practically to the forms of 
power with which one finds oneself confronted. A fundamental assumption in what 
follows is that a theory of political legitimacy should somehow make sense of this 
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encounter of a subject with political power. We inevitably treat the powers that be in 
one way or another, and in doing so we implicitly or explicitly take them to be 
legitimate or illegitimate. To ask whether the regime is legitimate is ask what 
practical stance it would be appropriate to take. Should I behave as a loyal, obedient 
citizen, or take to the streets and demand the fall of the regime? So the question of 
legitimacy is a practical predicament that calls for judgment, and such judgment 
concretely manifests itself in action.  
By judging legitimacy, then, I mean the task of distinguishing, from a practical 
point of view, whether the regime with which one finds oneself confronted is 
legitimate, or merely purports to be so. Philosophical approaches to political 
legitimacy take different views of what judging legitimacy involves and how one can 
perform it well, although the issue is not usually framed in these terms. My aim is to 
explicate and contrast these views. My conjecture is that approaching legitimacy as a 
problem of judgment offers an unfamiliar angle on the current state of play in the 
debate, cutting across familiar ways of carving out positions and raising a new set of 
questions. 
Three claims are advanced. First, the salient opposition among approaches to 
political legitimacy is not between “moralism” and “realism”. Recent accounts of 
legitimacy put forward under the banner of realism share a distinctive form with their 
moralist opponents, which I call “normativism”: they are preoccupied with the 
articulation and justification of normative standards or criteria. This tacitly assumes 
that judging legitimacy appropriately is a matter of applying the principles offered by 
a philosophical theory to a case at hand. The question of legitimacy appears as 
theoretical problem that calls for a certain kind of knowledge: the content and 
justification of valid norms (whether moral or non-moral in character). Apparently, 
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the question of legitimacy is to be resolved, in principle, by philosophy. If realism 
holds the potential for a deeper challenge to this picture of what a theory of legitimacy 
is about, that potential remains untapped.  
Second, as an initial step towards a different framing of the issue, I take a closer 
look at the principles of legitimacy put forward by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. 
Neither theorist, it turns out, is committed to the normativist picture of judgment, at 
least where the legitimacy of a regime is concerned. The principles of “liberal” and 
“democratic” legitimacy that they propose express what renders power legitimate 
against the background of a constitutional democratic order—they are not meant to 
adjudicate the legitimacy of that order as such. A theory of democratic legitimacy is 
not eo ipso a theory of political legitimacy.  
Still, from the fact that they cast principles of legitimacy in a different role, it does 
not follow that their theories don’t speak to the latter problem at all. This becomes 
apparent only once we question the assumption that the job for a theory of political 
legitimacy is to offer a principled solution in the first place. My third claim is that a 
“pragmatist” approach offers prospects for rethinking political legitimacy more 
radically than realists have done thus far. It shifts the direction of enquiry from the 
content of principles to the activity of judging. The task for a theory of legitimacy, on 
this view, is in first instance to grasp the various ways in which questions of 
legitimacy present themselves in concrete situations, prior to, and perhaps instead of, 
resolving them philosophically. I find implicit in the performative upshot Rawls’ and 
Habermas’ theories of constitutional democracy intimations toward a different picture 
of what judging the legitimacy of a regime involves. Judging legitimacy, on this 
approach, is understood to consist in practical engagement with the question of 
legitimacy, rather than the application of theoretical knowledge. This illuminates what 
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is politically at stake in the question of legitimacy, thereby rendering explicit what 
remains implicit in Rawls and Habermas. 
 
Moralism as a form of normativism 
A common way to define the task for a philosophical theory of legitimacy is by 
contrast to social science. If social scientists focus on the empirical efficacy of 
people’s taking the authorities as legitimate (or illegitimate), philosophers aim to 
articulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for it to really be legitimate, or to 
have the “right to rule.” Put differently, their self-ascribed task is to determine the 
criteria by which political authority ought to be judged, as opposed to the empirical 
circumstances in which it is in fact accepted or not (see, e.g., Simmons 1979; 
Flathman 1995; Copp 1999, 4; Christiano 2004a; Huemer 2013; Buchanan 2002, 689; 
Estlund 2008, 2; Green 1990, 5). As Robert Paul Wolff expresses this division of 
labor:  
The study of the forms, characteristics, institutions, and functioning of de facto states, 
as we may call them, is the province of political science. If we take the term in its 
prescriptive signification, the state is a group of persons who have the right to exercise 
supreme authority within a territory. The discovery, analysis, and demonstration of the 
forms and principles of legitimate authority—of the right to rule—is called political 
philosophy. (Wolff 1970: 5) 
Usually the right to rule is conceived as a moral right and legitimacy a moral 
property, although what that means is typically less than clear.1 Political philosophy is 
then a kind of applied ethics. In the words of Robert Nozick:  
 
1 A minority of theorists tries to justify principles of legitimacy prudentially or instrumentally 
rather than morally (Kühnelt 2008).  
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Moral philosophy sets the background for, and boundaries of, political philosophy. 
What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do through the 
apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is 
permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state’s fundamental 
coercive power has. (Nozick 1974: 6)  
Theorists in this tradition have produced a wide array of competing views, 
defending inter alia the consent of the people, democratic procedures, a modicum of 
peace and stability, or respect for human rights as valid criteria or conditions of 
legitimacy. It is not necessary to treat these accounts comprehensively here. What is 
crucial is how the question of legitimacy is framed as a philosophical problem: a 
quest for the discovery of valid principles. Accounts along these lines respond to a 
particular view of what a theory of political legitimacy is meant to provide: a criterion 
or a set of criteria that enables one to distinguish between what merely appears to be 
legitimate or is taken as such, and what really is. It is assumed that legitimacy is a 
problem that can be resolved, at least in theory, by finding the correct standard.  
For lack of a better word, I will refer to this framing of the question of legitimacy 
as calling for a resolution by appeal to the right principles, and the associated task 
description of political philosophy as focused on finding such principles, as 
“normativism.”2 “Moralism” is just one possible form of normativism, which holds 
that such norms must be moral in character (whatever that means, exactly). It is easy 
to see why this approach has wide appeal: it promises to resolve the question of 
legitimacy by giving subjects a secure standard, a kind of knowledge unencumbered 
by the relations of power that we seek to assess, which provides critical leverage 
against the authorities we face. It helps us to speak truth to power. Indeed, it seems to 
many philosophers obvious that this form of knowledge—a set of determinate 
 
2 For a similar term of art (with wider extension), see (Sluga 2014) 
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normative criteria—is just what we ask for when we raise a question of legitimacy. 
Just consider the apparent self-evidence with which Nozick and Wolff posit their 
definitions of the task of political philosophy.  
Judging legitimacy—distinguishing in practice whether a regime is legitimate, or 
merely purports to be so—is at most an afterthought for normativists. If theorizing 
legitimacy is all about the content and justification of principles of legitimacy, then 
judgment seems just to be a matter of applying such principles to particular cases. If 
you find yourself confronted with a regime, and want to know whether it is legitimate, 
you need to appeal to two distinct forms of knowledge: principles and facts about the 
case. These forms knowledge are usually assumed to be independent: the former are 
to be established by moral theory (a “theory of legitimacy”), the latter by empirical 
enquiry. Take, for example, theories that posit express consent, rational acceptability, 
or democratic procedures as the proper standard of legitimacy (Simmons 1999; Nagel 
1991; Christiano 2004b). Judging the legitimacy of a regime would then be a matter 
of determining whether its subjects consented to its rule; whether it met standards of 
reasonableness;3 or whether it ruled democratically. To see this at work in a nutshell, 
consider this passage from John Simmons:  
The proper grounds for claims of legitimacy concern the transactional components of 
the specific relationship between individual and institution. Because I subscribe to 
political voluntarism as the correct account of these transactional grounds for 
legitimacy, and because I believe no actual states satisfy the requirements of this 
voluntarism, I also believe that no existing states are legitimate (simpliciter). (Simmons 
1999: 769)  
 
3 We would have to know what those standards are, of course, and for Nagel, determining that 
is precisely the crucial task for political theory: “The question is, what supplies the standard 
of reasonable, morally permissible rejection which provides the true test of the legitimacy of a 
system, as opposed to rejection based only on superior leverage and unmodified self-
interest?” (Nagel 1991: 39)  
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Simmons’ judgment appeals to a factual claim about actual states, and a normative 
doctrine, “voluntarism,” which is the idea that individuals can become bound by 
obligations only through an act of their own will. Judgment takes the form of a 
subsumption of the former under the latter.  
 
Figure 1: The role of judgment implicit in moralist theories of political legitimacy.  
This picture corresponds to a common but controversial view of judgment in 
moral philosophy: to judge is to apply a general norm or principle to a particular case. 
As Kant observed, norms never simply dictate their application.4 If propriety lies in 
conformity with a rule, and if a rule cannot dictate its own application, something else 
is required, in addition to the rule and the facts about the case, to establish whether or 
not an act is appropriate. That extra is the act of practical judgment. Judgment is what 
 
4 “[N]o matter how complete the theory may be, a middle term is required between theory and 
practice, providing a link and a transition from one to the other. For a concept of the 
understanding, which contains the general rule, must be supplemented by an act of judgment 
whereby the practitioner distinguishes instances where the rule applies from those where it 
does not. And since rules cannot in turn be provided on every occasion to direct the 
judgement in subsuming each instance under the previous rule (for this would involve an 
infinite regress), theoreticians will be found who can never in all their lives become practical, 












bridges the gap between principles and concrete actions. Various moral and legal 
philosophers have offered complex accounts of what norm-application involves 
(Richardson 1990; O’Neill 2007), while others have called the whole picture into 
question, criticizing the very idea that morality should be understood in terms of 
general principles (McDowell 1979; Dancy 2004; Lance and Little 2006).5 But such 
disputes about judgment have not seeped into the debate about political legitimacy.  
Five aspects of this picture are worth highlighting. First, judging is construed as a 
subjective moment of decision, a conscious act of bringing principles to bear on a 
case. As such it precedes action in public. Because it occurs in foro interno, the 
subject is sovereign over his or her judgment: its content is determined solely by the 
subject’s will or intention. This equation of judgment and decision is commonplace, 
but it is not self-evident.  
Second, for this act of judgment to begin, two forms of knowledge must be treated 
as given: a theory of legitimacy (as conventionally understood), and a factual 
understanding of the situation. These must be ready to hand. This is not to suggest 
that they must be certain or infallible, but as far as judgment is concerned, they must 
be treated as settled: one must proceed as if the facts and norms are given. The 
activities that issue in such knowledge are not themselves part of judging legitimacy: 
they are a matter of philosophical justification, where the norms are concerned, and of 
empirical enquiry to sort out the facts, perhaps with the help of social science or 
journalism. In other words, one must first obtain the right normative standards and get 
a grip on the situation, then judge whether or not the authorities are legitimate.6 This 
 
5 The complications of norm-application are also well known in legal theory, and scholars 
there see adjudication as much more complex than the subsumption of a particular under a 
given rule (e.g. Alexy 2003).  
6 To be sure, this view allows that theoretical justification and empirical enquiry involve 
judgments of some sort, but it would a different kind of judgment. Onora O’Neill expresses 
this clearly: “When we act we may as a preliminary matter have to decide how to view the 
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makes it rather difficult to see how judgment can get off the ground when we face 
disagreement and uncertainty about the relevant criteria and about key aspects of the 
situation, as is frequently the case in situations where legitimacy is in question.  
Third, the picture invokes a fairly strict separation of justification and application, 
or theory and practice. It is true that application is often seen to have a role at the 
theoretical level as well, as when theorists try to come up with examples and 
counterexamples in justifying or refuting certain principles. Various approaches in 
moral philosophy deny that the content and justification of principles is independent 
of their application. For instance, Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” approach to justice 
involves a back-and-forth between formulations of principles and considered 
judgments of concrete cases, and Miriam Ronzoni argues for the “incorporation of 
judgment within the constructivist procedure that is meant to deliver normative 
principles” (Ronzoni 2010: 76; Rawls 1999). Still, while this results in a more 
complex and perhaps more contextual picture of the theoretical enterprise, it does not 
involve a rethinking of what is involved in a practical encounter with authorities. The 
fact that historical and hypothetical examples are usually seen as functioning just as 
well for theoretical purposes is revealing. From a practical point of view, judging 
legitimacy is just a matter of applying principles. This is what enables Simmons, in 
the passage quoted above, to judge all states illegitimate in one fell swoop.  
The fourth point is closely related: this picture relies on the crucial assumption 
that the content and justification of appropriate principles are invariant across the 
differences of perspective between a theoretical and a practical context, let alone 
among situated subjects within such a context. That is not to say that criteria are 
 
situation in which we already find ourselves […]: here reflective judgement may indeed be 
needed. But even when reflective judging is completed, and we have determined how to view 
the situation, we will still need to decide what to do: and that is where practical judgement 
does its work.” (O’Neill 2007: 402–3)  
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necessarily posited as universally valid—the point holds also for contextualist 
theories, insofar as they construe the content and justification of principles as 
independent of their application, even if valid only for a particular context. Judgment 
so conceived is impersonal and ahistorical, in the sense that it does not matter who 
judges, where, and when, as long as the judging subject has knowledge of the relevant 
state of affairs and valid principles. What is required for judging legitimacy is 
epistemic access to the correct facts and principles, not a concrete practical relation to 
the authority in question, or to other subjects. 
Finally, on this picture the quality of judgments depends on the validity of the 
norms, the truth of the facts, and a correct subsumption of the latter under the former. 
Good judgment consists in a certain facility with theoretical knowledge. In other 
words, judging well is understood in terms of getting the propositional content right. 
Once we have resolved the question of correct criteria and have gathered the facts, all 
that’s left to do is to “apply” this knowledge. While every good Kantian knows that 
that apparent ease is deceptive, there appears to be little more that can be said about it 
theoretically.  
Perhaps few normativist theorists would endorse all aspects of this picture, if 
asked. Is it fair to attribute this rather simplistic picture of judgment to them? We are 
entitled to treat theorists of legitimacy as committed to this view of judgment when 
two considerations obtain.7  First, the theory of legitimacy in question focuses on 
normative standards, to the exclusion of any explicit discussion of what judging 
legitimacy involves. And second, the theorist accepts, implicitly or explicitly, that the 
question of legitimacy is in the final instance a practical predicament, a question that 
 
7 David Copp has written on both legitimacy and judgment, although in different contexts 
(Copp 1995; 1999). For him, normative judgment is indeed a matter of applying a given, 
independently justified standards. So in his case, commitment to the picture sketched here is 
not implicit but explicit.  
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political subjects face in real-life situations, and that calls for judgment. If you think 
that a theory of legitimacy is supposed to respond in some way to such a practical, 
political problem, and if that theory essentially consists in an account of normative 
standards, then apparently judging legitimacy in practice amounts to nothing more 
than somehow bringing such a theory to bear on particular cases. Normativism (as a 
task description for a theory of legitimacy) and this conception of judgment (as norm-
application) belong together by default.  
One could deny the second claim, and argue that a theory of legitimacy need not 
be practical. The moral principles captured by a theory of legitimacy may still 
articulate meaningful truths, even if they do not immediately issue in practical 
judgments. David Estlund (2014), for example, has argued that moral principles need 
not be problematic just for failing to be immediately action guiding. A theory of 
legitimacy could still describe the moral truth about a regime, even if people cannot 
bring themselves to recognize it. However, our question here is not about people’s 
motivations for adopting certain principles, and whether or not such motivations 
matter for the validity of principles as theoretical solutions to the question of 
legitimacy. The issue here is rather whether the theoretical problem is adequately 
understood as calling for this kind of solution in the first place. It is hard to see what 
“political legitimacy” means, or what philosophical problem it names, in abstraction 
from a political predicament that subjects encounter in practice. If a theory of 
legitimacy is not an attempt to grasp what is at stake in a concrete practical question, 
what is it about? Estlund’s framing of legitimacy as a fundamental moral property that 
we can think about in abstraction from the ways in which it manifests itself in practice 
takes for granted a contentious objectivist moral metaphysics. The approaches 
discussed below have in common that they deny that we can treat such a conception 
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of morality as an unproblematic starting point when thinking about political 
legitimacy.  
 
Political realism as a form of normativism 
Political realists call into question the view of morality as the authoritative, 
determinate and knowable starting point for political thinking, rejecting what they call 
“ethics-first” approaches to political theory and denying the “priority of morality to 
politics” (Geuss 2008; Williams 2005; cf. Hall and Sleat 2017). It is notoriously 
difficult to pin down exactly what distinguishes realism from moralism. The basic 
distinctions in terms of which realists frame their critique are often overdrawn, such 
as a distinction between politics and morality as mutually exclusive domains of 
human interaction, or a dichotomy between moral and political values (see Erman and 
Möller 2015a; Jubb and Rossi 2015a; Erman and Möller 2015b; Jubb and Rossi 
2015b). What is clear is that, for realists, a preoccupation with moral knowledge 
comes at the cost of understanding political phenomena.  
However, realists’ opposition to moralism does not automatically translate into an 
alternative to normativism. If we look carefully at the proposals for rethinking 
political legitimacy recently offered under the banner of realism, we see that they 
typically exhibit essentially the same picture of what a theory of legitimacy is 
supposed to provide, except that they hold that the principles must not be “moral” but 
“political” in character. The point of the exercise is still construed in terms of 
specifying “more realistic criteria for legitimacy”, as Matt Sleat put it (2014: 315; cf. 
Cozzaglio and Greene 2019).8 What it means for criteria to be “realistic” is difficult to 
 
8  Hence John Horton’s suspicion is apropos: to what extent does the realist project really 
differ from that from which it sets itself apart? (Horton 2010: 445–46)  
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spell out, and realists disagree about this. For some it has to do with the content of the 
criterion, where a standard is taken to be more realistic if it sets a lower bar, which is 
more easily met by a regime (Horton 2010). For others it has to do with the scope of 
criteria, where what makes a regime legitimate depends on the historical context 
(Williams 2005). Still others construe it as a matter of justification, insisting that 
relevant criteria must have their source “within” politics rather than “outside” it, for 
instance with reference to the point and purpose of the political practice at stake 
(Rossi 2012). Insofar as these are the terms in which they frame the problem 
theoretically, realists do not fundamentally call the normativist view of judgment as 
norm-application into question (see Figure 2).9  
 
 
Figure 2: Realist accounts of legitimacy usually (implicitly) accept the normativist picture of judgment 
with minor adjustments.  
 














There is no reason in principle why realists should find this job description 
particularly attractive, and indeed some, like Glen Newey, regard a purely normative 
approach to political philosophy as being “unduly narrow and [having] a constricted 
sense of its possibilities” (Newey 2001: 34). Still, while the realist literature does 
offer intimations of a more radical rethinking of political legitimacy, this has not been 
systematically pursued.  
The reception of Bernard Williams’s reflections on political legitimacy is 
instructive in this regard. In search of an alternative to moralistic conceptions of 
legitimacy, Williams insists that what matters crucially for legitimacy is whether rule 
“makes sense” to those subjected to it, where what makes sense is understood not 
from a moral standpoint that all must rationally accept, but in terms of their actual 
normative expectations (Williams 2005). According to Williams, historically 
contingent circumstances have made it so that “liberalism”, understood in some broad 
sense, informs what makes sense “now and around here”, but that does not mean 
liberal principles should be elevated to the status of universally valid criteria that each 
and every regime ought to meet. What counts as an acceptable response to the 
question of legitimacy (or the “Basic Legitimation Demand”, as Williams calls it) 
crucially depends on who is subjected (when, and where), not in terms of their 
essential constitution as human beings, as rational agents, or as social animals, but in 
terms of who they contingently and first-personally take themselves to be, and the 
specific beliefs and expectations in relation to the regime that characterize them. Put 
differently, the question of legitimacy is first and foremost a question of what one can 
live with, given the historically specific self-conception one finds oneself with.10  
 
10 The “first political question” is not therefore, as Williams seems to suggest, a matter of 
establishing order and stability but of asking what kind of order one can live with (Fossen 
2019b). 
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Williams did not flesh out the idea much further than this. Working out in more 
depth what “making sense” might mean in connection to the question of legitimacy 
could point in the direction of a different way of thinking about the problem. But 
realists who draw on Williams have thus far been more concerned with working out 
whether this idea yields a non-moralistic “generally applicable standard of basic 
legitimacy” and with the content of what makes sense in some particular context, not 
with examining the activity of sense-making (Bavister-Gould 2013: 594). 11  John 
Horton and Matt Sleat in particular have drawn on Williams to propose what they 
regard as realistic criteria of legitimacy. On their view a regime is legitimate to the 
extent that the normative commitments embodied in the regime are “congruent” with 
the commitments (or beliefs, attitudes, and values) endorsed by those subjected to it.12  
What does judging legitimacy consist in, on this view? Sleat is explicit about this 
(2014: 326): “Judgements about the legitimacy of a political order, or the use of 
political power, are assessments of the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between 
that order and the beliefs, values and normative expectations that its subjects have of 
political authority”. Of course, the governed are quite likely to disagree about that in 
struggles for legitimacy. But the criterion does not presuppose that there is a single, 
unambiguous answer to what subjects regard as legitimate. Sleat and Horton rather 
conclude from this that legitimacy is a matter of degree, and that a regime is never 
perfectly legitimate. Getting a sense of the views that predominate in a particular 
 
11 Whether Williams would go along with this is questionable. Edward Hall plausibly 
suggests that “the primary purpose of Williams’ account is not to provide an alternative 
(albeit minimal) set of principles that ground a state’s right to rule, but to enable us to 
understand the nature of politics itself.” (Hall 2015: 469)  
12 Horton (2010: 141): “Fundamentally, it is about the acknowledgement of state as having 
authority [...] in terms that are taken to be salient within the context in which such authority is 
exercised and affirmed.” Sleat (2014: 325): “What matters is that the political order makes 
sense as a form of legitimate authority in relation to the beliefs (moral, political, social, 
economic, etc.) of those who are subject to it, that it conforms to people’s values and 
standards, and that it meets the normative expectations that we have of it.”  
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context (and thus of the standards that the regime should meet) is a difficult 
interpretative exercise and there is no presumption that any resulting interpretation 
will be without remainder.  
The congruence principle is obviously highly sensitive to the contingent ways in 
which subjects think of themselves and their political situation. In this way Horton 
and Sleat mean to avoid treating morality as a given prior to politics, while 
nonetheless gaining some critical purchase on regimes, although that critical purchase 
must be worked out in concrete cases in a manner that is highly contextual. Notice, 
however, that this does not fundamentally alter the normativist picture. The content of 
judgments of legitimacy which result from applying the congruence principle is 
highly sensitive to context, since the principle makes reference to the beliefs and 
values of those subjected to power. But the form of judgment remains impersonal and 
ahistorical: it does not matter who does the judging, where and when, as long as one 
has normative knowledge the correct standard (congruence, on this proposal) and 
epistemic access to the facts at hand (the views of the subjected, and the actions of the 
regime). It does not matter who judges, it only matters who (and what) is judged 
about.  
Aside from this structural similarity to the moralist views it seeks to avoid, the 
congruence view is inherently problematic as a philosophical account of political 
legitimacy. Its conception of what judging legitimacy involves does not make sense 
from a practical point of view. It would be odd to say that people take different views 
about the legitimacy of a regime because they disagree which beliefs and values are 
prevalent in society, rather than because they themselves hold different beliefs and 
values. Making a legitimacy claim involves committing oneself, taking a stance 
toward the regime. Measuring congruence involves just the opposite: to avoid bias 
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and distortion, one must bracket one’s own normative expectations and substitute 
those of the governed, asking not whether it meets one’s own commitments, but 
impartially whether it meets those one attributes to the community at large. It is 
telling in this respect that the congruence view of legitimacy was initially proposed by 
David Beetham as a social-scientific and decidedly not a philosophical view 
(Beetham 1991: 13). Regardless of Beetham’s insistence that claims about legitimacy 
are judgments and not mere descriptions of people’s beliefs—judgments of “the 
degree of congruence […] between a given system of power and the beliefs, values 
and expectations that provide its justification” (ibid.: 11)—these are judgments from a 
distinctly third-personal point of view, and not first-personal attributions of a 
normative status. What makes such judgments scientifically respectable is that the 
social scientist does not judge by reference to his or her own preferred standards, but 
by standards that “pertain within the society in question” (Ibid.: 13) Taking a practical 
stance toward a regime and measuring congruence therefore involve very different 
ways of relating to oneself and to others. A crucial consequence of this is that 
“legitimacy” means something very different in the hands of the social scientist than 
in the hands of those claiming and contesting legitimacy in practice. This renders the 
congruence conception ill-suited for a political realism that aims to grasp what 
judging legitimacy involves from a participant’s standpoint. As Simon Hope aptly 
puts it: “the realist political philosopher is thinking merely of subjects participating in 
a practice, in a way that cannot be to think as such a subject.” (Hope forthcoming: 15)  
This concern could be alleviated by saying that congruence is not what legitimacy 
consists in, but just a normative condition for legitimacy, conceived more traditionally 
as the right to rule. Perhaps one thing that matters normatively for legitimacy is that 
those subjected to a regime are able to regard it as legitimate, according to criteria 
 18 
that they endorse. Along these lines, Amanda Greene recently argued that shared 
recognition of a regime as legitimate is a normative standard of legitimacy (Greene 
2017: 314). But this takes us back where we started, as such a view straightforwardly 
fits with the normativist framing of the question of legitimacy as calling for resolution 
in terms of knowledge of the correct normative standards.  
The congruence view relies on an interpretation of Williams’ notion of sense-
making that remains caught up with a normativist picture of judgment, which 
construes judging as the application of given principles, and in which the task for 
philosophy is to spell out those principles. I have not been able to find a realist 
account of legitimacy that questions this outlook. The scope of the salient criteria may 
be understood to be rather narrow, or the bar may be set rather low, but the task of 
political philosophy remains to discover a distinctive form of theoretical knowledge—
the content and justification of principles and criteria, however context-dependent. 
Judgment is still thought of as a moment of decision, in which one brings theoretically 
articulated norms to bear on the given facts of a particular situation. And the quality 
of such judgments is a matter of their propositional content. Such theories all make 
the same move of abstraction, a move astutely diagnosed by Raymond Geuss: they 
abstract the propositional content of political judgments from the practical situation 
that calls them forth—with its characteristic historical background, relations of power, 
and plurality of agents:    
It is not false to think of a political judgment as a belief, but it is an abstraction, an 
artificial isolation of one element or component or aspect from a wider nexus of actions 
and action-related attitudes, habits, and institutional arrangements, within which alone 
the judgment (finally) makes sense. (Geuss 2010: 8)  
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Geuss exaggerates when he dismisses much of political philosophy in a single stroke, 
but as a characterization of normativist approaches to legitimacy, whether moralist or 
realist, this is spot on. And it points in the direction of a different way of thinking 
about legitimacy, perhaps more true to the realist spirit, which tries to comprehend 
judging legitimacy as an activity.  
 
Principles of legitimacy in Rawls and Habermas  
One way to begin questioning the taken-for-granted job description for a theory of 
political legitimacy as narrowly concerned with the content and justification of 
principles is to take a closer look at the principles of legitimacy offered by two giants 
of twentieth century political philosophy: John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. While 
they are often considered prime exponents of moralism and figure as the butt of realist 
critiques, that framing of their position in the landscape obscures both the 
distinctiveness and the limitations of their work on legitimacy. Engaging with Rawls 
and Habermas will help us to open up different set of questions for a theory of 
political legitimacy to answer. It also helps to counter the perception that all attempts 
to articulate principles are by definition normativistic, i.e. a quest for knowledge of 
principles that solve the question of legitimacy.  
In contrast to normativist approaches, these thinkers do not aim to philosophically 
resolve the question of legitimacy, as staged at the outset—the question of how to 
relate practically to the regime with which one finds oneself confronted. Although 
they undeniably proffer normative standards of “legitimacy”, these principles do not 
purport to govern our basic stance toward a regime, but rather to provide immanent 
criteria for evaluating institutions, laws, or decisions in the context of that regime. 
With regard to the legitimacy of the regime as such, these principles are expressive 
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rather than adjudicative: they are not meant to adjudicate how one ought to relate 
practically to just any regime one might happen to find oneself with. Rather, assuming 
the context of a purportedly constitutional-democratic regime, they claim to express 
what would it mean for that regime to live up to its own expectations, and ours, qua 
citizens.  
To see this, it is crucial to recognize that the problems at the heart of Rawls’ and 
Habermas’ work are subtly but importantly different from the question of legitimacy 
as considered thus far. The aim of Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness—at least as 
presented in Political Liberalism—is to spell out the fair terms of cooperation among 
free and equal citizens, by articulating a set of principles that all citizens can 
reasonably accept despite profound disagreements, and which they can use to evaluate 
institutions and guide reforms. Habermas’ project in his most systematic political 
work, Between Facts and Norms, is to explicate the normative core of constitutional 
democracy. This similarly provides a critical standard for evaluating the democratic 
credentials of political processes and a horizon for their improvement.  
Habermas and (more tangentially) Rawls do frame this as a matter of legitimacy. 
This is how Rawls formulates the “liberal principle of legitimacy”: “Our exercise of 
political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason” (Rawls 2005: 137). And Habermas’s democratic principle says that 
“only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent (Zustimmung) 
of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally 
constituted” (Habermas 1996: 110). However, it is crucial to see that the point of 
these principles is different from what normativists are after, namely a moral or 
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political criterion that enables one to determine whether a regime is fundamentally 
legitimate or illegitimate. Rather they express the liberal (Rawls) or democratic 
(Habermas) legitimacy of laws, policies, or institutions against the background of a 
constitutional democratic regime, the more fundamentally political legitimacy of 
which is already granted once we get to consider these principles. A theory of justice 
or a theory of democracy is not eo ipso a theory of political legitimacy.13  
To be clear: I am not saying that these theories do not bear profoundly on the 
legitimacy of the political order in the context of constitutional democracies, but just 
that that question is not thematic as the explicit focus of theoretical reflection. And 
consequently the criteria they offer should not be taken as their theoretical answer to 
it. One has to consider the questions to which these principles of legitimacy are meant 
to respond. Rawls and Habermas do not ask, as moralists do, in the abstract ‘what 
renders political authority morally acceptable’ (cf. Sleat 2013: 351)? The point of 
these criteria for them is rather to articulate what it means to see ourselves as free and 
equal citizens in the context of a constitutional democratic regime, not to explain why 
we ought to see ourselves as such. Habermas, for one, says that the democratic 
principle “explains the performative meaning of the practice of self-determination on 
the part of legal consociates who recognize one another as free and equal members of 
an association they have joined voluntarily” (Habermas 1996: 110) In other words, 
the principle articulates the meaning of a practice from the standpoint of its 
participants; it does not explain the legitimacy of that practice to those unwilling or 
unable to see themselves as such. Similarly, Rawls takes himself to be interpreting in 
a coherent and systematic way the basic moral and political commitments that he 
 
13 Pace Christopher Meckstroth, who offers a sophisticated theory of what is involved in 
judging when a law or a reform appropriately counts as democratic, but not as such, I think, 
an account of judging political legitimacy (Meckstroth 2015: 7).  
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claims to find “implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society”, that is 
to say, in “the political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions 
of their interpretation [...], as well as historic texts and documents that are common 
knowledge” (Rawls 2005: 13–14). The posture that Rawls and Habermas adopt, and 
invite the reader to take as well, is that of a fellow democratic citizen, and in doing so 
they appeal not to the truth of some moral doctrine but only to an immanent account 
of what that posture entails. As Anthony Laden has put this point, for both thinkers 
“doing political philosophy within and for a democratic society requires abandoning 
the perspective of the theorist favored by utilitarians and many other political 
philosophers and adopting the perspective of the citizen” (Laden 2004: 289). Nuanced 
differences between them aside, Rawls and Habermas share this basic orientation of 
political thinking (cf. James 2005; Laden 2004; Gledhill 2012; Jubb 2015).  
The upshot is that the role of principles of legitimacy with respect to the political 
order as such (as opposed to particular institutions, laws, or decisions within that 
order) is expressive rather than adjudicative. If the question of legitimacy, at bottom, 
is how to relate practically to the regime with which one finds oneself confronted, 
here that question is recast more narrowly and specifically in terms of how to relate as 
free and equal citizens to each other and to the practice of collective self-government 
in which we, in their view, find ourselves engaged. Rawls and Habermas’ principles 
of legitimacy do not explicitly address the question of legitimacy at a deeper level 
than this (Langvatn 2016; Fossen 2015).14  They do not feel a need to, I think, in large 
part because they assume that doing so could only involve an appeal to moral truth, 
 
14 Langvatn observes that, while Rawls’ understanding of political legitimacy shifts 
throughout his career, he always tries to account for it against the background of a 
constitutional democratic regime (Langvatn 2016: 136).  
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and they recognize that politically, we cannot treat morality as given. 15  But the 
question of legitimacy does cut deeper, for nothing guarantees—certainly not the 
principles proposed by Habermas and Rawls (as they would acknowledge)—that the 
presuppositions of this starting point cannot be called into question, philosophically 
and politically. Insofar as a principle is expressive of what legitimacy requires within 
a particular type of order, it cannot determine the legitimacy of that order as such. 
Why commit to this type of regime and regard myself as a citizen in the first place? 
That is the question a normativist would want to adjudicate. But neither Rawls nor 
Habermas purports to resolve this philosophically. To a normativist, it will then seem 
as if their theories do not address the problem at all, since for the normativist the only 
meaningful theoretical response to the predicament is an attempt at a principled 
solution. But that is too quick: as I elaborate in the next section, we can see Rawls and 
Habermas engaging politically with the problem if we attend to the performative 
dimension of their work. 
If one wants to think through the question of legitimacy, the problem with 
Habermas and Rawls is that their accounts of legitimacy bear on the issue in a way 
that is too dependent on the context of a constitutional democratic regime. Their 
approach to legitimacy is too contextual not because it is biased toward the status quo, 
but because it fails to get to the bottom of the political problem. To be sure, we need 
to acknowledge that any such philosophical enquiry is situated in certain historical 
 
15 Rawls may be taken to espouse a moralized principle of legitimacy in his discussion of civil 
disobedience and the natural duty to support more or less (but not fully) just institutions 
(Rawls 1999: 293ff). The most Habermas provides in response to this issue is this 
consideration: “Philosophy makes unnecessary work for itself when it seeks to demonstrate 
that it is not simply functionally recommended but also morally required that we organize our 
common life by means of positive law, and thus that we form legal communities. The 
philosopher should be satisfied with the insight that in complex societies, law is the only 
medium in which it is possible reliably to establish morally obligated relationships of mutual 
respect even among strangers.” (Habermas 1996: 460) Karl-Otto Apel challenges Habermas 
on precisely this point (Apel 2002).  
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and political conditions, and that only a regime that facilitates free thought enables its 
unconstrained pursuit. Still, it is one thing to proceed theoretically from the stance of 
a citizen qua self-governing citizen, and another from that of a perplexed subject 
trying to grasp what is going on. The point here is not to demand a more fundamental 
principle of legitimacy, but to ask for a conceptual and ontological diagnosis of the 
problem that Rawls and Habermas leave implicit.  
 
Toward a pragmatist approach to political legitimacy 
To recapitulate: for normativists, distinguishing appropriately whether a regime is 
legitimate is a matter of applying the norms found by political philosophy. For 
judgment to go well, the judging subject must get the content right: the norms must be 
valid and the facts of the situation true. Judgment is cast as an ahistorical, impersonal 
moment of decision on the basis of independently given knowledge. Recent realist 
proposals to rethink legitimacy leave this picture of judgment in place, challenging 
only how it is filled in. Neither approach has paid sustained attention to the ways in 
which the question of legitimacy presents itself, and the forms of political activity 
through which it might be addressed in practice (if not resolved).   
Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of legitimacy adopt a viewpoint within the setting 
of a constitutional democratic regime. Contrary to normativism, the principles they 
proffer express rather than adjudicate judgments of the basic legitimacy of such a 
regime, while offering critical standards for its amelioration. Thus they do not purport 
to resolve the question of legitimacy philosophically. These principles make sense 
only from the citizen standpoint, whereas normativists remain indifferent as to the 
perspective from which a judgment of legitimacy is made. But if their principles are 
expressive of the legitimacy of the regime as such, they do not seem to get to the 
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bottom of the problem. And although Rawls and Habermas cast their principles of 
legitimacy in a different role, we have not yet found an explicit alternative to the 
normativist picture of what judging legitimacy involves. 
None of the approaches discussed so far offers an explicit and systematic account 
of what it means to take a stance toward the regime from a first-person practical 
standpoint, and what is involved in doing that well. Raising this question opens room 
for a different mode of engaging philosophically with the question of legitimacy, 
which we could label “pragmatist”. 16 As I see it, the distinctiveness of a pragmatist 
approach lies in reversing the direction of enquiry. Instead of treating judgment as an 
afterthought, we make it our central theoretical concern. Instead of starting by 
determining the content and justification of principles, and then enquiring how those 
principles might be applied in practice, a pragmatist approach starts by accounting for 
the activity of judging legitimacy. It inquires what it is we are doing in asking 
whether a regime is legitimate or not, seeking to make explicit how the question of 
legitimacy presents itself and engages us in practice. What are the conditions in which 
this predicament presents itself as a real-life, practical problem? What must one 
know, and what can one do, in order to distinguish whether the authorities with which 
one finds oneself confronted are legitimate, or merely purport to be so? 
Pursuing this line of enquiry would involve rethinking the concept of judgment in 
conjunction with the question of legitimacy. This could conceivably lead to various 
views of judgment and the role of principles therein. One possibility is that an account 
of judging legitimacy would just make explicit what normativist theories of 
legitimacy are already doing, complementing them with a more explicit and reflexive 
 
16 Alternative labels could work just as well. The approach I am sketching is akin to what 
Hans Sluga proposes to call a ‘diagnostic practice’ and John Horton ‘interpretive realism’ 
(Sluga 2014; Horton 2017).  
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understanding of how the principles it seeks to articulate bear on practice. 
Alternatively, it could have revisionary implications, bringing out unacknowledged 
limitations of the exercise of codifying principles, and new possibilities for thinking 
about the problem. In short, how much room a judgment-oriented approach to 
legitimacy leaves for traditional normative theories really depends on the outcome of 
further investigation—on a concrete philosophical account of the practical encounter 
between subject and authority.  
Such an account has not yet been systematically developed, so I can merely sketch 
some contours here (cf. Fossen 2013; 2014; Erman and Möller 2014; Festenstein 
2016; Fossen 2019a). We can get a preliminary sense of what this could mean 
concretely by extending our examination of Rawls and Habermas. The previous 
section suggested that their principles of legitimacy take the fundamental legitimacy 
of constitutional democracy for granted. It seems that the citizen standpoint takes too 
much political work for granted. Insofar as the legitimacy of the regime as such is 
concerned, judgment has to a considerable degree already happened before the 
principles enter the picture. But if we are interested in rethinking what judging 
legitimacy involves, this could offer a clue. Perhaps, in putting forward these 
principles, Rawls and Habermas enact a different mode of engaging with the question 
of legitimacy, one which reveals, by showing rather than telling, something of what is 
involved in judging legitimacy. What sort of activity or activities are they engaging 
in, in proffering their principles?  
Consider more closely the passage that leads up to Rawls’s formulation of the 
liberal principle of legitimacy.  
The background of this question [about the legitimacy of the constitution in a 
democratic regime—TF] is that, as always, we view citizens as reasonable and rational, 
 27 
as well as free and equal, and we also view the diversity of reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines found in democratic societies as a permanent feature 
of their public culture. Granting this, and seeing political power as the power of 
citizens as a collective body, we ask: when is that power appropriately exercised? That 
is, in the light of what principles and ideals must we, as free and equal citizens, be able 
to view ourselves as exercising that power if our exercise of it is to be justifiable to 
other citizens and to respect their being reasonable and rational? (Rawls 2005: 136–37)  
This is the question to which the liberal principle of legitimacy responds. Notice how 
much work is required to set the stage: we are asked to view others and ourselves as 
free and equal citizens; to see political power as “the power of citizens as a collective 
body”; and to regard diversity—the “fact of reasonable pluralism”—as a permanent 
fixture of our historically given situation.17 Only then can we see the problem as 
Rawls does (namely: how is fair cooperation possible despite profound 
disagreement?), and can the liberal principle of legitimacy enter the scene to help 
address it.  
This specific framing, much more than the liberal principle itself, is what 
constitutes Rawls’ response to the question of legitimacy. Rawls deliberately 
represents power in a specific way, expresses a sense of who we are, and offers us a 
historically situated sense of our present. Crucially, though, this framing is not 
rendered thematic by Rawls as part and parcel to his account of legitimacy, but is 
presented as prior to it.  
It would not be right exactly to say that Rawls and Habermas simply take for 
granted that the addressees of their theories are already willing and able to see 
themselves as citizens engaged in collective self-rule, even though the criteria they 
 
17 “History tells of a plurality of not unreasonable comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls 2005: 
140) 
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offer have their point only insofar as they do. That would miss the hortative 
dimension of their theorizing. They adopt the standpoint of a self-governing citizen 
not because they are sure that constitutional democracy has already been achieved, 
but because they believe it can only be realized if we collectively take up the 
standpoint they exhibit—however imperfectly the regime may presently live up to its 
ideals. I have argued elsewhere that implicit in the performative upshot of Habermas’s 
theory of democratic legitimacy is a view of judgment as a practice of world-building, 
a view which is otherwise associated much more with Hannah Arendt (Zerilli 2016). 
Habermas can be understood as inviting us to imagine our political world in such a 
way that, if we accept his invitation, we keep alive the promise of democratic self-
government. “Rational reconstruction” in this context means re-construction as much 
as re-construction (Fossen 2015).  
Something similar can be said of Rawls, as Anthony Laden has argued. By 
showing that if we bring ourselves to see each other as free and equal citizens of a 
constitutional democracy, then there is a coherent way of addressing our political 
problems fairly, Rawls invites us to indeed conceive of ourselves thus. 18 
Performatively, theorizing from the citizen standpoint can be understood not just as a 
defensive move—renouncing the philosopher-king’s throne and ceding the moral high 
ground—but also as offensive in stimulating those who are reluctant to see 
themselves as self-governing citizens to overcome their scruples and enter the forum.  
 
18 As Laden makes this point: “Very roughly, citizens in a pluralistic society might come to 
doubt whether a constitutional democratic regime is possible given that citizens can not be 
brought to agree on fundamental matters without the use of oppressive force. Faced with such 
a crisis of faith, we may find ourselves unable to muster the commitments and efforts at 
compromise and self-sacrifice necessary to make such a pluralistic democracy work. So this 
lack of faith is a political, not merely a philosophical, problem. Nevertheless, a large part of 
its solution lies within the conceptual domain of philosophy, insofar as our faith can be 
restored by a philosophical demonstration of the conceptual coherence of a pluralistic 
democracy. Rawls describes this role for philosophy as ‘philosophy as defense’.” (Laden 
2004: 292)  
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The key point, for now, is this. As we have seen, three acts of stage setting 
precede Rawls’s formulation of the liberal principle of legitimacy: Rawls invites his 
readers to see themselves as a body of free and equal citizens, and to view the regime 
with which they find themselves confronted as an expression of their own, 
collectively shared power. And he situates this in a narrative according to which 
pluralism is the inescapable historical condition in which we find ourselves. If my 
interpretation of the intended performative upshot of his theorizing is correct, then 
Rawls is here not merely stating what he takes as uncontroversial assumptions we (his 
readers) must already share. Rather, these acts of stage setting are political acts that 
we are asked to carry through, and our willingness or refusal to do so shapes our 
stance toward the regime.  
Now, what if we think of these acts of stage setting as acts of judgment? Perhaps 
it is precisely these kinds of political activity that constitute what judging the 
legitimacy of a regime consists in. That would mean that, in making these remarks, 
Rawls is not just setting the stage, preparing the ground for a moment of judgment in 
which a principle is applied. These apparently antecedent moments would in fact be at 
the heart of judgment. One’s grasp of who one is in relation to the authorities, what 
the regime is like, and the significance of events—these aspects of a situation in 
which one encounters authority are not given prior to judgment, but at stake in it (see 
Figure 3). The question of legitimacy would then not appear as a problem that calls 
for theoretical solution, but for philosophical explication and practical engagement.  
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Figure 3: Provisional sketch of a picture of judgment as a set of world-shaping activities. Rawls’ acts of 
stage setting are here regarded as constitutive dimensions of judgment.  
 
Philosophical pragmatists typically view thought and meaning as bound up with 
action in some fundamental sense, and resist what they regard as problematic forms of 
abstraction in other philosophical approaches. Along these lines, one might conceive 
of judging legitimacy not as mental moment of decision, but as a certain kind of 
political practice. A pragmatist approach could thus construe judging legitimacy as 
consisting in practical engagement with the question of legitimacy, rather than the 
application of theoretical knowledge. This takes to heart Geuss’ suggestion (noted 
above) that political judgments make sense only in a specific context of action, with a 
distinctive history, relations of power, and multiple points of view. It matters crucially 
who judges, where and when. How and why it matters would of course need to be 









This is of course just a sketch. A pragmatist theory of political legitimacy would 
need to explain which forms of activity should be seen as constitutive of judgment, 
and what is involved in performing them well. This opens up new terrain for theories 
of legitimacy. Theorists of legitimacy have not so far provided a systematic account 
of how and why the activities in which Rawls engages here—portraying power, 
articulating identity, and interpreting events—bear on the question of legitimacy, and 
what is involved in performing them in better and worse ways. Developing this 
thought could yield a way of thinking about the quality of judgment in terms of form, 
rather than just content. What it is for judgment to go well or poorly could be re-cast 
as depending on our modes of involvement in a situation, on the ways in which we 
experience and respond to various aspects of political reality, rather than our 
possession and subsequent application of the correct normative-theoretical and factual 
knowledge. The question is not just what one ought to know, but also what one can do 
to address the question of legitimacy aptly. This is not to deny that criteria may play a 
significant role in judging well, or that it is impossible to make them explicit, but to 
suggest that the quality of judgments of legitimacy cannot be reduced to their 
propositional content, but is a matter of how they are performed, how they form part 
of an ongoing activity. The challenge of explicating such forms of activity does not 
appear on the horizon of a theory of legitimacy if one frames the task for such a from 
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